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DEFERRING CLARITY: QUALIFIED IMMUNITY OF FEDERAL
OFFICIALS FROM
SUITS FILED BY AMERICAN CITIZENS ALLEGING TORTURE
Chelsea Anne Perdue*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has stated that a “state of war is not a blank
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s
citizens.”1 In the post-9/11 security chaos, a novel legal issue
burgeoned into a mass intra-agency debate, as the government began
detaining persons with little to no evidentiary basis for arrest.2 From
the heart of this debate sprung a series of conflicting cases in federal
courts concerning whether American citizens allegedly tortured by the
U.S. government have a right to sue federal officials for their
mistreatment. Legal scholars have paid much attention to the
presence of a Bivens claim in these cases.3 This Comment analyzes the
less-discussed, conflicting approaches the federal courts utilize in
determining whether qualified immunity exempts federal officials
from suit by American citizens who allege they have been tortured.

*J.D. Candidate, 2015, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Agnes Scott
College. I am grateful to Professor Mark Denbeaux for the years of guidance and
instruction in both scholarly works and life. Sincerest thanks must extend as well to
John Badagliacca and the Seton Hall Law Review for their thoughtful edits through this
Comment. I am eternally grateful to my family and friends for their kindness and
patience through the editing and writing process, most notably Thomas and Patsy
Perdue and Brenda Maddox.
1
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535 (2004).
2
Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 768 (9th Cir. 2012) (“There was at that time
considerable debate, both in and out of government, over the definition of torture as
applied to specific interrogation techniques.”).
3
A Bivens claim is one in which a plaintiff requests a court imply a cause of action
against a federal official for constitutional violations. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). For this claim to proceed, a
court must determine that “(1) Congress has not already provided an exclusive
statutory remedy; (2) there are no ‘special factors counselling hesitation in the absence
of affirmative action by Congress’; and (3) there is no ‘explicit congressional
declaration’ that money damages not be awarded.” Hall v. Clinton, 235 F.3d 202, 204
(4th Cir. 2000) (citing Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396–97).
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Although few cases have developed, they derive from the post-9/
11 debate on the definition of torture and provide fertile source for
analysis. Federal courts have avoided the burden of defining torture
for future applicants confronted by this situation by dismissing cases
on the basis of qualified immunity. Though the scope of this
Comment’s analysis is limited to thirteen opinions spanning four cases,
the issue is ripe for decision because federal courts are likely to face
similar claims in the future of our national security-minded country.
The federal courts and legislature have deferred to the executive
branch’s officers over the last five years, passing out qualified immunity
to officials with valid criminal proceedings against them. The
continued cry bemoans that there is no exact precedent on which to
rely. This is no surprise given the perpetual grants of qualified
immunity before cases can be heard on the merits. The Supreme
Court, too, has balked at the issue, denying certiorari and dismissing
these cases. This Comment’s goal is to take the patches of brilliance
from thirteen inconsistent and muddied cases and create a working,
complete legal-analytical framework under which the issue should be
discussed. Until the Supreme Court tackles the problem or the lower
courts agree on the proper or operative analysis, all future cases of
American citizens against federal officials for violent treatment will be
doomed before they begin.
This Comment consists of four overarching components. Part II,
provides a brief introduction to the legal foundation of qualified
immunity, an expansive and complex realm of scholarly development.
Part III, provides a comprehensive map of the four cases in question.4
Part IV attempts to sew the scattered pieces of analysis into a
comprehensive scheme, taking into consideration all collateral
complications addressed in each opinion. Finally, Part V concludes,
encouraging both the judicial and legislative branches to tackle the
problem of federal officials’ liability for criminal acts without fear of
the executive branch. With the segments of qualified immunity
analysis compiled in a cohesive structure, federal courts can meet the
needs of American citizens allegedly subjected to maltreatment by
federal officials.
4

Every lower court opinion is relevant to this topic because the appellate courts
are most guilty of shirking the qualified immunity discussion altogether or giving it a
cursory glance, hastily overturning or affirming the lower courts. The district courts
have grappled more thoroughly with the complexities of the qualified immunity issue.
The facts of the cases are also particularly relevant, considering much of the qualified
immunity discussion will turn on the specific allegations of each case to determine
whether there has been a violation of a clearly established right.
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II. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Qualified immunity is a doctrine that government officials invoke
to avoid liability when acting within the scope of their discretionary
function.5 These defendants “generally are shielded from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of what a reasonable
person would have known” at the time of action.6 Liability exists only
when a violation is “apparent,”7 because government actors “cannot be
required to predict how the courts will resolve legal issues.”8
Recently, the standard for qualified immunity analysis has shifted
from a merits-first requirement to an approach granting increased
discretion to federal courts.9 The original standard required district
courts to first determine whether “the facts alleged show the officer’s
conduct violated a constitutional right.”10 This prompted a discussion
on the merits of the case, encouraging “the process for the law’s
elaboration from case to case.”11 Otherwise, courts would be tempted
to “skip ahead” to the second prong, resulting in a speedier dismissal
of the case.12 The prior standard dictated that only after finding a
constitutional violation could the court analyze the second prong:
“whether the right was clearly established.”13 If a court found that the
facts alleged showed the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional
right, and this constitutional right was clearly established at the time of
the violation, then no qualified immunity would be granted to the
official.14 The Supreme Court warned that this analysis “must be taken
5

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790,
794 (4th Cir. 1995).
6
Id.
7
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
8
Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 196 (4th Cir. 2009); McVey v. Stacy, 157
F.3d 271, 277 (4th Cir. 1998).
9
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001);
Sarah L. Lochner, Qualified Immunity, Constitutional Stagnation, and the Global War on
Terror, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 829 (2011). Lochner analyzes the qualified immunity tests
implemented by the Supreme Court and concludes that lower federal courts should
continue to follow the merits-first test articulated in Saucier—especially in the context
of the Global War on Terror. Id. The implementation of the Saucier test by the judge’s
discretion will serve “not only a notice-giving purpose, but also a constitutionalupdating purpose.” Id. at 868.
10
Katz, 533 U.S. at 201.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
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in the light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general
proposition . . . .”15 The purpose of requiring this analysis is not only
to determine whether qualified immunity is appropriate in the
instance, but also to advance legal analysis of the issue.16 Qualified
immunity is designed to give “government officials breathing room to
make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal
questions.”17
In 2009, the Supreme Court modified the standard, giving lower
courts discretion to choose which prong of the test to administer first
and granting courts the ability to dismiss a case on qualified immunity
without discussing the merits of the case, namely whether a
constitutional right was violated given the alleged facts.18 This decision
effectively granted courts the power of exemption from complex and
controversial issues without having to grapple with the underlying
merits of the claim and the politically damning facts often
accompanying it.19 The purpose of the change was to relieve lower
courts of the burden of expending judicial resources on “an essentially
academic exercise.”20 The Supreme Court continued, however, to
encourage lower courts to analyze the constitutional claims before
reaching the second prong of the test granting dismissal for qualified
immunity.21
The doctrine of qualified immunity is far-reaching in both history
and discussion. Since its inception, qualified immunity has branched
into scholarly analyses ranging from Fourth Amendment excessive
force claims and police misconduct22 to Federal Wiretap Act claims,23
judge and jury roles,24 and general attempts to explain the intricacies
15

Id.
Katz, 533 U.S. at 201.
17
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011).
18
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009).
19
Id.
20
Id. at 237.
21
Id. at 236.
22
Karen Blum, Qualified Immunity in the Fourth Amendment: A Practical Application of
§ 1983 As It Applies to Fourth Amendment Excessive Force Cases, 21 TOURO L. REV. 571,
594 (2005); Kathryn R. Urbonya, Problematic Standards of Reasonableness: Qualified
Immunity in Section 1983 Actions for A Police Officer’s Use of Excessive Force, 62 TEMP. L.
REV. 61 (1989); Michael Potere, Note, Who Will Watch the Watchmen?: Citizens Recording
Police Conduct, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 273 (2012); Joann Rene Jenna Roth, Note, Qualified
Immunity: Private Rights of Action for Constitutional Police Violation Cases in Canada and the
United States, 4 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 245 (1997).
23
Kathleen Lockard, Note, Qualified Immunity as a Defense to Federal Wiretap Act
Claims, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1369 (2001).
24
Henk J. Brands, Note, Qualified Immunity and the Allocation of Decision-Making
Functions Between Judge and Jury, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1045 (1990); Paul D. Watson,
16
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of the doctrine.25 The narrow scope of the most recent academic and
judicial controversy asks when qualified immunity should be granted
to dismiss cases against federal officials brought by American citizens
claiming they were tortured and abused in detention. This controversy
comes to light in four relevant instances: Lebron v. Rumsfeld,26 Padilla v.
Yoo,27 Doe v. Rumsfeld,28 and Vance v. Rumsfeld.29
III. CASE DISSECTION
A. Lebron v. Rumsfeld30
1. Case Facts
Jose Padilla, an American citizen, was arrested at O’Hare
International Airport on May 8, 2002 and transferred to New York.31
By June 9, 2002, President Bush had designated Padilla an enemy
combatant through a directive to then-Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld.32 Padilla filed a writ of habeas corpus two days later.33 He
was then transferred to South Carolina where he was denied access to
counsel and communication with family and underwent “extensive
interrogation by government officials” until March 2004.34
Qualified Immunity: Should A Judge or Jury Decide Who Prevails in the Battle Between
Government Efficiency and Constitutional Rights?, 20 STETSON L. REV. 1035 (1991).
25
Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229 (2006);
Alexander A. Reinert, Does Qualified Immunity Matter?, 8 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 477
(2011); Karen M. Blum, Qualified Immunity: A User’s Manual, 26 IND. L. REV. 187
(1993); Chaim Saiman, Interpreting Immunity, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1155 (2005); John
C. Williams, Note, Qualifying Qualified Immunity, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (2012).
26
Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787 (D.S.C. 2011), aff’d, 670 F.3d 540 (4th
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012); Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012).
27
Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748 (9th
Cir. 2012); Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2012).
28
Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C.
Cir. 2012); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Doe v. Rumsfeld, No. 1:08CV-1902, 2012 WL 3890944 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2012), appeal dismissed, No. 12-5400, 2013
WL 4711610 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 2013).
29
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, opinion
vacated, (Oct. 28, 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133
S. Ct. 2796 (2013); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 2796 (2013).
30
Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787 (D.S.C. 2011), aff’d, 670 F.3d 540 (4th
Cir. 2012); Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2751 (2012).
31
Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 790.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
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Padilla’s enemy combatant designation was based on reports that
he was an Al Qaeda operative with possible plans to plant a dirty bomb
at the capital.35 There were also claims that Padilla discussed placing
bombs at gas stations, train stations, and hotels.36 Padilla was
purported to have “significant knowledge” of the plans and personnel
of Al Qaeda.37
In the complaint he filed in the District Court for the Southern
District of New York (“the SDNY”) in 2002,38 Padilla alleged that he was
a victim of “gross physical and psychological abuse,” mirroring
treatment designed for Guantanamo Bay detainees.39 This abuse
included threats of severe physical harm, threats to kill him, sleep
adjustment, use of stress positions, manacling and shackling for hours
on end, forced administration of psychotropic drugs, noxious fumes
causing pain, loud noise, forced grooming, withholding of mattress,
blankets, sheets, and pillows, shower suspension, constant surveillance
including while using the toilet and shower, removal of religious items,
and interference with religious observance.40 The complaint also
alleged Padilla was denied any contact with the outside world,
including legal counsel, for twenty-one months.41 In addition, Padilla
was allegedly denied medical treatment for “serious and potentially
life-threatening ailments, including chest pain and difficulty
breathing, as well as for treatment of the chronic, extreme pain caused
by being forced to endure stress positions.”42

35

Id. at 798.
Id.
37
Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 798.
38
Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), opinion
adhered to on reconsideration sub nom. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp.
2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
39
Third Amended Complaint ¶ 1, Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787
(D.S.C. 2011), aff’d, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012)
(No. 207CV00410), 2008 WL 4331638.
40
Third Amended Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 81. An example of a threat against
Padilla includes the threat to cut Padilla with a knife and subsequently pour alcohol
in the wound. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 81.
41
Third Amended Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 82.
42
Third Amended Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 101.
36
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2. Case History
Padilla filed his claim in the SDNY in 2002.43 Judge and future
Attorney General Michael Mukasey held that the President had
inherent authority as Commander-in-Chief to detain citizens as enemy
combatants.44 He reasoned that Congress’ Joint Resolution implicitly
authorized this power.45 Nonetheless, Judge Mukasey ordered the
government to provide Padilla access to legal counsel.46
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, holding
that the President does not have the authority to unilaterally designate
American citizens as enemy combatants and that Congress did not
implicitly authorize this presidential power.47 On appeal, the Supreme
Court vacated the district court judgment, arguing that New York did
not have jurisdiction over the habeas corpus claim, because the
petition must be filed where the detainee is physically present.48
Thereafter, Padilla was permitted to file his petition in South
Carolina.49 The District Court for the District of South Carolina
ordered Padilla’s release on the grounds the President had no implicit
authority to designate Padilla an enemy combatant, the cause of his
indefinite detention.50 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
(“the Fourth Circuit”) reversed, holding that the President had the
authority to detain Padilla indefinitely as an enemy combatant on
American soil.51
Padilla petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court, and days
before the government had to submit its brief, the government moved
to vacate the Fourth Circuit’s decision.52 In return, the government
requested that Padilla be transferred to the Southern District of

43

Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 596 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), opinion
adhered to on reconsideration sub nom. Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp.
2d 42 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 604.
47
Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 728–29 (2d Cir. 2003), rev’d and remanded, 542
U.S. 426 (2004).
48
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 451 (2004).
49
Id.
50
Padilla v. Hanft, 389 F. Supp. 2d 678, 690 (D.S.C. 2005), rev’d, 423 F.3d 386 (4th
Cir. 2005).
51
Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 397 (4th Cir. 2005) (“The Congress of the United
States, in the Authorization for Use of Military Force Joint Resolution, provided the
President all powers necessary and appropriate to protect American citizens from
terrorist acts by those who attacked the United States on September 11, 2001.”).
52
Id. at 583.
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Florida to face criminal charges of conspiracy.53 The Fourth Circuit
denied the motion on the grounds the government was merely
attempting to evade review by the Supreme Court.54 The Supreme
Court granted the request to transfer Padilla to civilian authorities in
Florida based on separation of powers and mootness.55 Padilla’s
criminal trial commenced in Miami on May 5, 2007.56 The jury
convicted Padilla on all counts, sentencing him to seventeen years and
four months in prison.57
In 2007, Padilla brought a civil suit in the South Carolina District
Court, alleging his designation as an enemy combatant violated federal
statutory and constitutional rights.58 The district court dismissed the
complaint on all counts: the Bivens claim, the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act (“RFRA”) claim, and the claim of a constitutional
violation as a result of his designation as an enemy combatant.59 The
defendants received qualified immunity as to the RFRA and
constitutional violation arguments.60 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court, addressing only the Bivens claim, the RFRA claim, and
Padilla’s lack of standing in the opinion.61
3. Case Description
At the onset of the action, Padilla named sixty-one defendants.62
Over time, litigation whittled the number of defendants to seven.63
These remaining defendants fall into three categories: the then53

Id. at 584.
Id. at 584–87.
55
Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006) (“That Padilla’s claims raise fundamental
issues respecting the separation of powers, including consideration of the role and
function of the courts, also counsels against addressing those claims when the course
of legal proceedings has made them, at least for now, hypothetical.”).
56
Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 794 (D.S.C. 2011), aff’d, 670 F.3d 540
(4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012).
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 800, 805.
60
Id.
61
Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 556, 560–61 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132
S. Ct. 2751 (2012).
62
Id. at 546.
63
Id. Initial defendants include “Legal Professional Defendants” accused of
“formulating the program of confinement and interrogation” and interfering with
Padilla’s right to counsel. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 28. Initial
defendants also consisted of “Medical Professional Defendants” who monitored
Padilla’s medical state during interrogation and covered their nametags to avoid
identification. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 39, ¶¶ 29–30. Additionally,
unidentified “Interrogator Defendants” and “Guard Defendants” were named at the
onset of litigation. Third Amended Complaint, supra note 39, ¶¶ 31–32.
54
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Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, the former Naval Consolidated
Brig Commanders, and high-ranking officials involved with
policymaking.64 Padilla sued Panetta in both his individual and official
capacities, seeking declaratory relief and an injunction against
designation as an enemy combatant.65 Catherine Haft and Melanie
Marr, former Naval Consolidated Brig Commanders, allegedly
“implemented the unlawful regime devised and authorized by Senior
Defense Policy Defendants.”66 In addition, Padilla asserted that former
Defense Department General Counsel William Haynes, former
Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Vice Admiral Lowell E.
Jacoby, former Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, and former
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz exhibited “extreme
indifference to an obvious risk of serious harm” to Padilla, “conspired
to bring about a regime of extreme and unlawful detention and
interrogation” of enemy combatants, and “permitted the application
of those unlawful policies” to U.S. citizens on U.S. soil.67
The district court found that qualified immunity applied to all
defendants named in the action in all counts regarding designation
and detention as an enemy combatant.68 The court engaged in a twopart analysis of the qualified immunity question.69 First, the court
determined that Padilla’s designation as an enemy combatant did not
violate any “clearly established Constitutional rights.”70 Considering
the case history, Judge Gergel determined that the “strikingly varying
judicial decisions appear to be the very definition of unsettled law.”71
Second, the court determined Padilla’s detention and designation as
an enemy combatant did not violate any “clearly established” federal
law: “To say the scope and nature of Padilla’s legal rights at that time
were unsettled would be an understatement.”72 The court reasoned
that the Department of Justice “officially sanctioned” the techniques
implemented against Padilla.73 Additionally, the Department of
Defense declared the government’s actions lawful.74 Demonstrating
64

Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d at 546–47.
Id. at 547.
66
Third Amended Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 7.
67
Third Amended Complaint, supra note 39, ¶ 5.
68
Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 805 (D.S.C. 2011), aff’d, 670 F.3d 540
(4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012).
69
Id. at 803–04.
70
Id. at 803.
71
Id.
72
Id. at 803–04.
73
Id. at 803.
74
Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 803.
65
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the lack of unanimity on the issue, the FBI and General Counsel of the
Navy advised that the methods violated both American law and the
Geneva Convention.75 To compound conflicting opinions, “[n]o court
had specifically and definitively addressed the rights of enemy
combatants.”76
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment for
all defendants.77 They did not, however, address the qualified
immunity claim deriving from Padilla’s treatment and designation as
an enemy combatant.78 Instead, they based the affirmation on the
collateral Bivens claim,79 qualified immunity from the RFRA claim,80
and a lack of standing.81 The United States Supreme Court denied the
petition for writ of certiorari.82
B. Padilla v. Yoo83
1. Parties and Arguments
The facts of Padilla v. Yoo mirror those of Lebron v. Rumsfeld,
discussed above. John Yoo, President Bush’s Deputy Attorney General
in the Office of Legal Counsel at the time of Padilla’s designation as
an enemy combatant, was the defendant named in this action.84
Padilla’s complaint in this action alleged that Yoo was the “de facto
head of war-on-terrorism legal issues,” considering the promulgation
of his legal memoranda,85 and that he “shaped government policy in
his role as key member of a small, secretive, and highly influential
group of senior administration officials known as the ‘War Council,’
which met regularly ‘to develop policy in the war on terrorism.’”86
75

Id.
Id.
77
Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 562 (4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2751 (2012).
78
Id. at 556 (“Because we conclude that Padilla’s Bivens action cannot be
maintained, we need not reach the questions of whether the defendants are entitled
to qualified immunity or whether Padilla has pleaded his claim with adequate
specificity.”).
79
Id.
80
Id. at 560.
81
Id. at 561–62.
82
Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012).
83
Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748 (9th
Cir. 2012); Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2012).
84
Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1030, 1014.
85
First Amended Complaint ¶ 19, Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (N.D. Cal.
2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. 08-cv-00035-JSW), 2008 WL 2433172.
86
First Amended Complaint, supra note 19, ¶ 15 (citing JOHN YOO, WAR BY
OTHER MEANS (Atlantic Monthly Press 2006)).
76
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The complaint sought a “judgment declaring that the acts alleged
[t]herein [were] unlawful and violate[d] the Constitution and laws of
the United States” and sought “[d]amages in the amount of one
dollar.”87 Padilla leveled tripartite arguments against Yoo.88 First, that
Yoo was personally involved in the decision to designate Padilla an
enemy combatant in violation of U.S. law, because he personally
reviewed the reports on Padilla.89 Second, the policies Yoo prepared
approved of the “decision to employ unlawfully harsh interrogation
tactics”90 which “proximately and foreseeably led to the abuses
suffered.”91 Finally, Yoo abused the power of his position as a lawyer by
drafting memos with the intent to shape government policy designed
to immunize officials and “evade all legal constraints.”92 Additionally,
Padilla alleged violations of the following constitutional and statutory
rights: denial of access to counsel, denial of access to court,
unconstitutional conditions of confinement, unconstitutional
interrogations, denial of freedom of religion, denial of the right of
information, denial of the right to association, unconstitutional
military detention, denial of the right to be free from unreasonable
seizures, and denial of due process.93
Defendant Yoo moved for dismissal of the action for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.94 Yoo advanced three
arguments that Padilla failed to state a claim for money damages.95
First, Yoo argued that the Bivens rule creating a private cause of action
against federal officials in some circumstances did not apply.96 Second,
he argued that qualified immunity should be granted because
“Plaintiffs have failed to establish that Defendant Yoo personally
participated in any violation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.”97
Finally, Yoo contended that qualified immunity should be granted
because “Plaintiffs have not alleged a violation of any constitutional
87

First Amended Complaint, supra note 85, ¶¶ 15, 19, 36, 38, 46.
First Amended Complaint, supra note 85, ¶ 84.
89
First Amended Complaint, supra note 85, ¶¶ 37, 38.
90
First Amended Complaint, supra note 85, ¶ 27.
91
First Amended Complaint, supra note 85, ¶ 46.
92
First Amended Complaint, supra note 85, ¶¶ 3, 15.
93
First Amended Complaint, supra note 85.
94
Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748
(9th Cir. 2012).
95
Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 754 (9th Cir. 2012).
96
Defendant John Yoo’s Motion to Dismiss at 12–23, Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp.
2d 1005 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2012) (No. C 08-00035 JSW),
2008 WL 941436 (citing Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)).
97
Defendant John Yoo’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 96, at 26.
88
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rights.”98
2. Case Description
The district court ruled in Padilla’s favor on both issues collateral
to qualified immunity: the Bivens claim and the RFRA claim.99 The
court of appeals forwent discussion of Bivens and “resolve[d] all claims
under qualified immunity.”100
The district court held that Yoo was not entitled to qualified
immunity from suit.101 The court separated the analysis into two parts:
whether there was a claim stated for violation of constitutional rights
and whether basic constitutional protections were clearly
established.102 Yoo argued that he was not personally responsible for
any violation of Padilla’s constitutional rights.103 The district court
rebutted Yoo’s arguments by finding a causal link between Yoo’s
actions and the constitutional violations allegedly suffered.104 To find
causation, “direct personal participation” was not required.105 The
court noted that an alternative causal link could be established if the
actor “set[s] in motion a series of acts by others which the actor knows
or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict the
constitutional injury.”106 The court found that several actions Yoo took
were critical in creating a causal link between the defendant and the
constitutional violation.107 The court held that Yoo “participated
directly in developing policy on the war on terror” by drafting
memoranda laying the “legal groundwork” for designation of persons
as enemy combatants.108 He also “personally reviewed” the compiled
documents assessing Padilla’s detention and wrote a legal opinion

98

Defendant John Yoo’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note 96, at 32.
Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1030, 1039.
100
Yoo, 678 F.3d at 757.
101
Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1038.
102
Id. at 1032, 1036.
103
Id. at 1032. There are four main arguments to support Yoo’s claim. Id. First,
that Yoo’s memoranda were just a fragment of the “complex mechanism employed by
the President” that led to Padilla’s designation as an enemy combatant. Id. Second,
the legal memoranda explicitly state, “Yoo was not expressing any view on the policy
decisions” of the President. Id. Third, the memoranda (with only one exception)
were designed to apply to those captured outside of the United States. Id. Finally,
there are no facts that link Yoo with any specific treatment allegedly suffered. Id.
104
Id. at 1034.
105
Id. at 1032–33 (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743–44 (9th Cir. 1978)).
106
Yoo, 633 F. Supp 2d at 1032–33.
107
Id. at 1033–34.
108
Id. at 1033.
99
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based on the review.109 Attorney General Ashcroft relied on Yoo’s legal
opinion when recommending to the President that Padilla be
detained.110 Yoo specifically advised federal officials that “military
detention of an American citizen seized on American soil was lawful”
because the “Fourth Amendment had no application to domestic
military operations in [that] context.”111 Additionally, after a War
Council meeting concerning the legal justification of interrogation
techniques including waterboarding and mock burials, Yoo
promulgated a renowned memorandum defining torture as causing
pain “equivalent in intensity to the pain accompanying serious physical
injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or even
death.”112
Given Yoo’s approval of these techniques and his knowledge of
Padilla’s detention, the court held that it was foreseeable these
techniques—alleged to violate constitutional rights—would be
inflicted on Padilla as a direct result of Yoo’s actions.113 The district
court found a violation of the constitutional right to access courts114
and the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.115 On the other hand, the court found no violation of the
Fifth Amendment.116 Finally, the district court concluded its analysis
by holding that the constitutional rights afforded Padilla were clearly
established at the time of the violation.117

109

Id. (citing JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS (Atlantic Monthly Press
2006)).
110
Yoo, 633 F. Supp 2d at 1033.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 1033–34. Jay Bybee and John Yoo composed the infamous memorandum,
commonly referred to as one of the Torture Memos. Along with the definition of
torture that sparked a nationwide scholastic response, the memoranda advised the
executive branch that the Geneva Convention did not apply to detainees captured in
the war on terror. JAY BYBEE, MEMORANDUM FOR ALBERTO R. GONZALES,
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR
INTERROGATION UNDER 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A 1 (2002), available at
http://dspace.wrlc.org/doc/bitstream/2041/70964/00355_020801_001display.pdf;
JOHN YOO AND ROBERT J. DELAHUNTY, MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM J. HAYNES II,
GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, RE: APPLICATION OF
TREATIES AND LAWS TO AL QUAEDA AND TALIBAN DETAINEES (2002),
available at http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/02.01.09.pdf.
113
Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1034.
114
Id. at 1035.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 1036.
117
Id. at 1039.
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This analysis mirrored that of the court when evaluating the
substantive constitutional rights of Padilla.118 The district court first
noted that the facts of the complaint “clearly violate the rights afforded
to citizens held in the prison context.”119 Then, the court declared
“unpersuasive” the defendant’s argument that there is no precedent
for affording such a high level of constitutional rights to American
enemy combatants detained on American soil.120 The court reasoned
that as long as authority indicated that “‘the disputed right existed,
even if no case had specifically so declared,’ the Defendants would be
on notice of the right.”121 In this case, there was notice because “federal
officials were cognizant of the basic fundamental civil rights afforded
to detainees under the United States Constitution.”122
After the defendants’ appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
(“the Ninth Circuit”) held Yoo was entitled to qualified immunity,
because at the time of Padilla’s detention, American citizens had no
clearly established right protecting them from the treatment Padilla
underwent.123 In addition, the court reasoned Yoo was not on notice
that his conduct violated the law.124 Although the treatment
“appear[ed] to have been a violation of his constitutional rights” as
prohibited by the Supreme Court in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,125 the court of
appeals found Hamdi inapplicable.126 Additionally, the court of appeals
118

Id. at 1036.
Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1036.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 1036–37 (citing Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978, 989 (9th Cir.2007)); see
infra Part IV.B.3.ii.
122
Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1037. The court argues that Supreme Court precedent
would have afforded a federal official such as Yoo notice that his actions violated
Padilla’s constitutional rights. Id. The first opinion referenced holds that denial of
medicine can constitute suffering “inconsistent with contemporary standards of
decency as manifested in modern legislation” that requires care for prisoners. Estelle
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976). In addition, the district court considers the
Supreme Court holding that “persons who have been involuntarily committed are
entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals
whose conditions are designed to punish.” Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–
22 (1982).
123
Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 748, 761, 768 (9th Cir. 2012).
124
Id. at 768.
125
Id. at 761.
126
Id. The court of appeals’ reasoning in finding Hamdi inapplicable centered
around three arguments. Id. First, that Hamdi was decided in 2004, after Yoo’s alleged
actions spanning his years in office from 2001 to 2003. Id. Consequently, Yoo had no
notice of the holding in Hamdi applicable to enemy combatants. Yoo, 678 F.3d at 761.
Second, “it remain[ed] murky” whether enemy combatants were afforded the same
protection from constitutional violations that prisoners were. Id. Finally, the court of
appeals reasoned that although Hamdi extended the protection of due process to
enemy combatants, the Supreme Court suggested the rights may not parallel those
119
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held that in light of Supreme Court precedent found in Ex parte Quirin,
a federal official “could have had some reason to believe that Padilla’s
harsh treatment fell within constitutional bounds.”127
Although the court mentioned that Padilla’s detention “could
have been helpful to the United States in staving off further terrorist
attacks,” it renounced the sentiment by a hasty claim: “We express no
opinion as to whether those allegations were true, or whether, even if
true, they justified the extreme conditions of confinement to which
Padilla says he was subjected.”128 The court maintained that Padilla was
not “just another detainee,” and it was not reasonably apparent that
Padilla was entitled to the constitutional safeguards of an accused
criminal or prisoner.129
The Ninth Circuit also held that although “officials can still be on
notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual
circumstances,” that was not the case in this instance.130 Although
torture of American citizens is unconstitutional “beyond debate,”131 the
issue of whether, from 2001 to 2003, the actions leveled against Padilla,
“however appalling,” were torture was subject to debate.132

granted to other kinds of detainees. Id. Since the Supreme Court in Hamdi stated that
enemy combatants’ rights “may be tailored” to each circumstance, the government
had flexibility in bestowing rights. Id. (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533
(2004)).
127
Yoo, 678 F.3d at 762. Ex parte Quirin involved a U.S. citizen detained as an enemy
combatant and tried by a military commission. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 24 (1942),
modified sub nom. U.S. ex rel. Quirin v. Cox, 63 S. Ct. 22 (1942). The Supreme Court
held the detainee was not entitled to a trial by jury and grand jury presentment in light
of the historic practice of trying enemy combatants in military court. Id. at 38–44. The
detainee’s American citizenship was immaterial. Id. at 37–38, 44–45.
128
Yoo, 678 F.3d at 762. The court briefly references Supreme Court precedent
describing “[i]ncommunicado detention for months on end” as an “unlawful
procedure[ ] to extract information.” Id. (citing Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 465
(2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
129
Id.
130
Id. (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)). An exaggerated
illustration of the application of the rule would be that welfare officials are not
statutorily prohibited from selling children into slavery, but that does not mean they
would be immune should they do so. K.H. Through Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846,
851 (7th Cir. 1990).
131
Yoo, 678 F.3d at 763.
132
Id. at 767–68.
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C. Doe v. Rumsfeld133
1. Case Facts
Plaintiff, John Doe, worked for a defense contractor in Iraq as a
translator after retiring from the United States Army.134 Doe worked
for the United States Marine Corps Human Exploitation Team,
successfully obtaining Iraqi Sheikh Abd Al-Sattar Abu Risha’s Sheikh’s
support on behalf of the United States.135 While Doe was preparing for
annual leave scheduled for November 5, 2005, the Navy Criminal
Investigative Service questioned Doe for several hours after
transporting him to an airbase in Anbar.136 Doe refused to answer any
questions after being denied an attorney.137 Consequently, he was
blindfolded, kicked, and an officer threatened to shoot Doe should he
attempt escape.138 Doe’s questioners then flew him thirty minutes away
and placed him in the custody of the Marine Corps, who promptly
strip-searched Doe and placed him in isolation.139 After seventy-two
hours of isolation, Doe was once more hooded and transported to
Camp Cropper, a military facility for “high value” detainees near
Baghdad.140 Doe spent three months in isolation before being moved
to cell housing with alleged Al Qaeda members.141 Doe’s military
affiliation was publicized to the inmates and, as a result, he was
attacked on multiple occasions.142 The complaint states that Doe “lived
in constant fear for his life.”143 During this time, the guards also
assaulted and choked Doe.144 In addition, the guards subjected Doe to
psychological duress, preventing Doe from sleeping by keeping the
lights on, playing heavy metal music at “intolerably loud volumes,” and
banging on the cell door when Doe appeared to be sleeping.145

133

Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C.
Cir. 2012); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Doe v. Rumsfeld, No. 125400, 2013 WL 4711610 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 2013).
134
Complaint at ¶ 4, Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683
F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (No. 1:08-cv-01902), 2008 WL 7182131.
135
Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 4.
136
Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 56.
137
Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 60.
138
Complaint, supra note 134, ¶¶ 65, 66.
139
Complaint, supra note 134, ¶¶ 67, 68.
140
Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 73.
141
Complaint, supra note 134, ¶¶ 83, 84.
142
Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 86.
143
Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 89.
144
Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 82.
145
Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 78.
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Doe’s first status hearing took place on December 22, 2005.146 The
hearing’s purpose was to determine whether Doe should retain his
designation as “security internee,” be released as an “innocent
civilian,” or further detained as an “enemy combatant.”147 Doe’s
requests for an attorney or a member of his team to serve as a witness
were denied, and his custodians told him that the only evidence he
could present was evidence “reasonably available” to him in the
camp.148 During the hearing, Doe could not view evidence against him,
hear testimony, or cross-examine testimony brought against him.149
After a “very short” hearing, the Status Board determined Doe was a
threat and authorized his continued detention.150 Doe spent the next
six months in captivity before receiving notice of a second Status
Hearing in July 2006.151 Once again, his custodians denied his requests
for an attorney, limited his presentation of evidence to that
“reasonably available” to him at Camp Cropper, and denied the ability
to present evidence from the Human Exploitation Team.152 This
hearing lasted “much longer than the first” and included inquiry into
Doe’s treatment and “what he would do if he were released from the
Camp.”153 Doe was finally released in August 2006 after being
blindfolded and told he was being transferred.154
2. Case Description
The district court began its analysis by establishing that Doe had
no implied or express private right of action under the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005.155 In addition, the court dismissed without
prejudice Doe’s allegation of denial of the right to travel, with the
opportunity to amend his complaint upon remand.156
The
government’s motion for a more definite statement in regards to Doe’s
allegation of interference with his right to travel was denied.157 Also,
the court held there were “no special factors to preclude a Bivens
146

Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 99.
Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 96.
148
Complaint, supra note 134, ¶¶ 97, 98.
149
Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 100.
150
Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 101.
151
Complaint, supra note 134, ¶¶ 102, 103.
152
Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 104.
153
Complaint, supra note 134, ¶ 106.
154
Complaint, supra note 134, ¶¶ 116–18.
155
Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 104 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
156
Id. at 125.
157
Id. at 126.
147
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remedy for Doe’s alleged constitutional claims, and because there were
no alternative remedies available for the due process violations of
which Doe complained, the court concluded that Doe could assert a
cause of action under Bivens.”158
The district court divided its analysis of qualified immunity into
three parts: (1) substantive due process,159 (2) procedural due
process,160 and (3) access to courts.161 The court led the discussion with
causation, because liability under Bivens relies on the perpetrator
being “personally involved in the illegal conduct.”162 Under this
heading, the court immediately dismissed Doe’s procedural due
process and access to court claims.163 The decision on both counts
centered on the flawed argument that because Rumsfeld “had final say
over the continued detention or release of detainees,” he inferentially
had control over the procedural rights of detainees.164
The court found, however, that Doe’s complaint pleaded facts
sufficient to allege Rumsfeld’s personal involvement in the alleged
breach of substantive due process rights.165 Doe established causation
through specific instances of Rumsfeld’s approval of interrogation
techniques, continued involvement in modifying and enhancing
interrogation techniques, and through Rumsfeld’s dispatch of Major
General Miller, in charge of Guantanamo Bay at the time, to the camp
Doe was held at with instructions to “gitmo-ize” it.166
The district court then went through the test for qualified
immunity, determining first that “Doe had a constitutional right to be
free from conduct and conditions of confinement that shock the
conscience.”167 It reasoned “that such right was clearly established at

158

Id. at 111.
Id. at 115–21.
160
Id. at 121.
161
Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 121.
162
Simpkins v. D.C. Gov’t, 108 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
163
Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 114, 115.
164
Id. at 114. The quote derives from the analysis of the procedural due process
portion of the opinion. Id. In the section on the access to courts, the district court
similarly stated that Doe alleged that “Rumsfeld controlled the decision to release
detainees.” Id. at 115.
165
Id. at 114 (“At this early stage of proceedings in this case, Doe’s allegations
sufficiently support his claim that Rumsfeld was involved in the substantive due process
violations related to the conditions of confinement and interrogation at Camp
Cropper. He has alleged with adequate specificity that Rumsfeld knew of, ordered,
and approved the alleged constitutionally deficient interrogation methods and
detention conditions employed in Iraq.”).
166
Id. at 113–14.
167
Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 115.
159
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the time of Rumsfeld’s conduct,” and finally “that Doe ha[d] pleaded
factual allegations sufficient to support a claim that Rumsfeld’s
conduct violated this clearly-established right.”168 Rumsfeld’s qualified
immunity defense failed in regards to the substantive due process
violations.169 Constitutional violation turned on the district court’s
decision to “consider[] the cumulative impact” of the constitutional
violations alleged.170 The court considered two proposed theories of
liability, intent to injure and deliberate indifference, and held that Doe
satisfied both.171 Doe sufficiently alleged that Rumsfeld’s intent to
harm rose to a “conscience-shocking level” on the grounds that
Rumsfeld merely asserted there was a legitimate government interest
in Doe’s detention without evidentiary support.172
The court
additionally reasoned that the question should be taken up at a later
“stage of litigation when the Court can properly consider such
evidence.”173 The district court also held that Doe’s complaint
sufficiently alleged Rumsfeld’s deliberate indifference to Doe’s
substantive due process rights.174 Though Rumsfeld argued these
actions intended to “restore order or security” in the “dangerous and
volatile conditions in Iraq,” the court dismissed those arguments on
the ground there was no evidence Doe’s detention was an attempt to
“quell violence or restore order within Camp Cropper.”175
Finally, the court faced Rumsfeld’s claim that the violated
constitutional rights were not clearly established at the time to the
extent that no reasonable official in Rumsfeld’s position would have
known the conduct was unconstitutional.176 The district court
dismissed Rumsfeld’s contentions on the grounds the constitutional
rights of American citizens abroad were clearly established at the time
of the violation.177 In addition, the court reasoned that judicial
precedent established the rights of pretrial detainees.178 The court
168

Id.
Id.
170
Id. at 116.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 116–17 (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998)).
173
Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 117.
174
Id. at 119.
175
Id. at 118.
176
Id. at 119. Rumsfeld’s claim is grounded on the contention that no court had
held that an American citizen possessed constitutional rights on a foreign battlefield
when detained by the American military. Id. at 120.
177
Id. at 119.
178
Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 119. The Court referenced a Supreme Court
opinion holding that “pretrial detainees, who have not been convicted of any crimes,
retain at least those constitutional rights that we have held are enjoyed by convicted
169
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explained that there is nothing distinctive about the camp at which
Doe was held to justify an exemption to his clearly established
constitutional rights abroad.179 Also, the shock the conscience
standard and its legal foundation in relation to both unconstitutional
conduct and conditions of confinement were clearly established at the
time of the alleged violations.180 The district court’s thorough analysis
led to the final holding that Rumsfeld was not entitled to qualified
immunity, because a reasonable official in his position would have
known the actions violated the Constitution.181
The court of appeals, finding that there was no Bivens remedy
available to Doe, forewent an analysis of Rumsfeld’s qualified
immunity defense.182 On remand, the district court only dealt with the
claim of interference with the right to travel, where it “reluctantly” held
in the defendants’ favor.183 Adding finality to the case, the court of
appeals dismissed Doe’s appeal in July 2013.184
D. Vance v. Rumsfeld185
1. Case Facts
Two American citizens, Donald Vance and Nathan Ertel, alleged
that in 2006, they were detained unlawfully in a military compound in
Iraq and subjected to interrogations via “physically and mentally

prisoners.” Id. (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979)).
179
Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 120.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 121.
182
Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 397 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Because we have
determined that Doe may not bring a Bivens action against Secretary Rumsfeld, we
need not consider Secretary Rumsfeld’s qualified immunity defense to such an
action.”).
183
Doe v. Rumsfeld, No. 1:08-CV-1902, 2012 WL 3890944 (D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2012),
appeal dismissed, No. 12-5400, 2013 WL 4711610 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 2013). In this brief
opinion, the district court blatantly expressed sympathy for Doe and reluctance to find
in favor of the defendants. Id. The court indicated exasperation with both the attitude
of the government and the lack of resources available to Doe. Id. They asserted that
Doe “might have accepted an apology from our government, had it ever offered one.
But it didn’t.” Id. They were compelled to rule in favor of defendants “in spite of
Doe’s appalling (and, candidly, embarrassing) allegations” and urged him to “consider
the Department of Homeland Security’s Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, through
which, for better or worse, he can get ‘final agency action.’” Id.
184
Doe v. Rumsfeld, No. 12-5400, 2013 WL 4711610 (D.C. Cir. July 15, 2013).
185
Vance v. Rumsfeld, No. 06 C 6964, 2009 WL 2252258 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2009),
rev’d, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d,
701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en
banc granted, opinion vacated, (Oct. 28, 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir.
2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013).
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coercive tactics . . . reserved for terrorists.”186 Vance, a Navy veteran,
and Ertel, a government contracting employee, acted as employees of
a military contractor in Iraq, Shield Security Group (“SGS”).187
Plaintiffs witnessed other agents pay Iraqi leaders, and they suspected
illegal activities were taking place.188 Vance reported the activity to the
FBI regularly, eventually uncovering evidence of the group’s
protection of enemy Iraqi arms dealers and leaders.189 In addition, the
“[p]laintiffs came to learn that SGS . . . was amassing and selling
weapons for profit.”190
Ertel resigned on April 1, 2009, and the next day he and Vance
were denied access to move freely around the compound: “They were
trapped.”191 Military personnel came to seize them and their
belongings containing the evidence gathered against SGS, including
laptops, cameras, and cell phones.192 Plaintiffs were classified “security
internees,” enabling interrogators to “detain Plaintiffs indefinitely
without due process or access to an attorney.”193
Once transferred to Camp Prosperity, plaintiffs were stripsearched and placed in a cage before being transferred to 24-hour
solitary confinement.194 After a short stay at Camp Prosperity, they
spent the remainder of their detention in solitary confinement at
Camp Cropper, Baghdad.195 Feces lined the walls of their cells, which
were kept “extremely cold” with the lights perpetually left on.196 The
prison attempted to deprive detainees of all sleep by blasting heavy
metal music and banging on the cell doors when guards noticed a
prisoner nodding off.197 Plaintiffs were repeatedly denied water, food,
clothing, and medical care.198 In addition, “guards would also torment
186

Amended Complaint ¶¶ 1–3, Vance v. Rumsfeld, No. 06 C 6964, 2009 WL
2252258 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2009), rev’d, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc,
701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012) (No. 06 C 6964), 2007
WL 928914.
187
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 30, 32, 41, 44–45.
188
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 49–50.
189
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 51–53, 67, 71–72, 79–81, 87–89, 96,
101, 105.
190
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 111.
191
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 124, 127–28, 130.
192
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 138–39.
193
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 145.
194
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 152, 154. Plaintiffs were permitted to
use the bathroom twice per day and slept on a thin mat over concrete. Amended
Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 154.
195
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 157.
196
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 159–60.
197
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 162.
198
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 163–166. After a tooth of Ertel’s
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Plaintiffs, apparently trying to keep them off-balance mentally.”199
They were continually subjected to assault and threats of further
assault.200 Plaintiffs were denied phone calls, access to counsel, and
requests for clergy multiple times.201 During this time, they were
regularly interrogated on non sequitur topics, one of which concerned
what they planned to do if they were released and whether they would
pursue legal action or write a book.202
Around April 20, 2006, the plaintiffs received a letter from the
Detainee Status Board stating a hearing regarding their status would
be held April 23, 2006 at the earliest.203 The letter stated that they
would not be provided access to counsel and could present only
evidence “reasonably available” to them from prison at Camp
Cropper.204 Each plaintiff requested his laptop and cell phone to prove
he was providing intelligence to the American government regarding
SGS’s illegal activities.205 This evidence was withheld.206 Plaintiffs were
denied their requests to have others present and could not review or
hear evidence against them.207 In the meantime, “neither Mr. Vance’s
nor Mr. Ertel’s family or friends knew of their detention despite
vigorous efforts to contact United States officials to determine the
Plaintiffs’ whereabouts.”208
Ertel was classified an innocent civilian on May 17, 2006, one
month after the Detainee Status Board had his hearing.209 He was not
released for another 18 days.210 Vance was detained an additional two
months, and was not declared an innocent civilian until July 20, 2006.211
At this time, he was dropped at the Baghdad International Airport to
“fend for himself without the documentation needed to return to the

became infected from denial of basic medical care, he had it hurriedly yanked out.
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 166. Afterwards, guards confiscated all
antibiotics and painkillers, so the hole became infected and filled with puss. Amended
Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 167. No further medical care was administered for it.
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 167.
199
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 169.
200
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 170–71.
201
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 175–77, 179.
202
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 178–89.
203
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 190–91.
204
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 190–91.
205
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 194.
206
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 195.
207
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 200–01.
208
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 204.
209
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 208.
210
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 209.
211
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶¶ 210–11.
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United States.”212 In total, Ertel was held in solitary confinement and
interrogated for forty days, and Vance was held for nearly one hundred
days without any criminal charges against them.213
Plaintiffs brought suit against Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in
his individual capacity, the unidentified individual defendants who
subjected them to interrogations, and the United States for the return
of their personal property.214
2. Case History
In 2009, a district court ruled only on the seizure of property
question, holding that the plaintiffs properly pleaded and survived a
motion to dismiss.215 Simultaneously, there was an action pending in
the district court addressing the claims of cruel and inhumane
treatment, requiring analysis of a Bivens cause of action, qualified
immunity, procedural due process, and denial of access to courts.216
Although this court dismissed the plaintiffs’ counts alleging
procedural due process217 and denial of access to courts,218 it held the
plaintiffs presented a cause of action under Bivens219 and that Rumsfeld
was not entitled to qualified immunity.220
Rumsfeld’s personal involvement in the inhumane treatment,
and thus causation, was established using evidence identical to that
presented by the plaintiff in Doe v. Rumsfeld.221 The court next moved
to the initial stage of the qualified immunity test of whether plaintiffs’
treatment violated a constitutional right.222 The court concluded the
212

Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 211.
Amended Complaint, supra note 186, ¶ 213.
214
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 598 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted,
opinion vacated (Oct. 28, 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013).
215
Vance v. Rumsfeld, No. 06 C 6964, 2009 WL 2252258 (N.D. Ill. July 29, 2009),
rev’d, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d,
701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012).
216
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 961, 975, 977 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 653
F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 701 F.3d
193 (7th Cir. 2012).
217
Id. at 977.
218
Id. at 978.
219
Id. at 975.
220
Id. at 971.
221
Id. at 962–64.
Evidence includes Rumsfeld’s approval of enhanced
interrogation techniques, continued research into interrogation with the Working
Group, and assignment of MG Miller of Guantanamo Bay to the camp to “gitmo-ize”
it. Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 113–14 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
222
Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 966.
213
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conditions alleged were sufficient to lead a court to “plausibly
determine that the conditions of confinement were torturous.”223
Finally, the district court found the final part of the qualified immunity
test, whether the constitutional right was clearly established at the time
of the violation, favored the plaintiffs.224 The district court found most
persuasive plaintiffs’ argument that the Constitution applies to
American citizens in full force whether inside or outside the nation’s
borders: “[T]he right of American citizens to be free from torture is a
well-established part of our constitutional fabric . . . .”225 In addition,
though Rumsfeld’s position was not “uncomplicated by the pulls of
competing obligations,” he had ample “opportunity to reflect on the
material and constitutional consequences of his alleged actions.”226
The district court claimed that the holding does not second-guess
military officials, but instead “represents a recognition that federal
officials may not strip citizens of well-settled constitutional protections
against mistreatment simply because they are located in a tumultuous
foreign setting.”227
Though the court of appeals reversed the earlier decision to
permit the plaintiffs’ claim for personal property to continue,228 it
affirmed the district court’s holding for the plaintiffs in regards to
finding personal involvement of Rumsfeld in the abuse,229 Rumsfeld’s
lack of qualified immunity,230 and the plaintiffs’ cause of action under
Bivens.231 The court of appeals launched into its analysis of qualified
immunity, finding there “can be no doubt” that the alleged treatment
violated constitutional rights of Americans, “even in a war zone.”232
Addressing defendants’ claims that the allegations were “vague,
cursory, and conclusory,” the court of appeals listed specific examples

223

Id. at 967.
Id. at 971.
225
Id. at 969–70.
226
Id. at 971 (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853 (1998)).
227
Id.
228
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 627 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted,
opinion vacated (Oct. 28, 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013).
229
Id. at 603. Note the slight disparity in conclusions between the district court
and court of appeals. The court of appeals found “the plaintiffs’ pleadings, if true,
have sufficiently alleged not only Secretary Rumsfeld’s personal responsibility in
creating the policies that led to the plaintiffs’ treatment but also deliberate
indifference by Secretary Rumsfeld in failing to act to stop the torture of these
detainees despite actual knowledge of reports of detainee abuse.” Id. at 600.
230
Id. at 611.
231
Id. at 626.
232
Id. at 606–07.
224
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of the defendants’ standard for pleading being too demanding.233
Next, the court extended the protections of the Eighth Amendment
beyond convicted prisoners and to pretrial detainees.234 It analogized
the conditions of Vance’s treatment to the permitted treatment of
convicted prisoners and concluded it “would have no trouble
acknowledging that his well-plead allegation” would describe a
constitutional violation.235 In addition, the court cited two pieces of
legislation that should have placed Rumsfeld on notice: the Ronald W.
Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 and
the Detainee Treatment Act.236 Finally, the court dismissed the
defendants’ argument that courts have repeatedly “struggled, and
continue to struggle, with the precise constitutional contours
applicable to the detention of individuals . . . seized in a foreign war
zone.”237 The court based this refutation on the argument’s weakness
in citing “only cases involving procedural due process claims.”238 In
conclusion, the court of appeals denied Rumsfeld’s qualified immunity
defense, authorizing the claim to proceed.239
IV. PIECING TOGETHER THE OPTIMAL STANDARD
Though each court engaged in seemingly endless variants of
analysis, in part to be blamed on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Pearson, a cohesive approach can be derived, enabling courts to test
qualified immunity in these instances with ease.240 The Pearson case no
longer requires, but merely encourages, the merit-first method to
determining qualified immunity.241 For the sake of completeness, this
Comment’s legal analysis framework will include the fully permitted,
233

Id. at 607–08. First, defendants argued plaintiffs provided no “factual context,
no elaboration, no comparisons” beyond claiming the cell was “extremely cold.” Id. at
607. The court of appeals dismissed the defendants’ argument, stating it was “satisfied”
with the description. Id. Second, defendants attacked the plaintiffs’ complaint for not
including the issue of whether they asked for a blanket or warm clothing and were
denied. Id. at 608. The court of appeals again stated the specific statement of what
plaintiffs were given, “a single jumpsuit and a thin plastic mat,” was sufficient. Id. The
court also dismissed defendants’ argument that the plaintiffs did not describe how
long they were deprived of sleep, only that they were. Id.
234
Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d at 607–08.
235
Id. at 609.
236
Id. at 610.
237
Id.
238
Id. The defendant relied on recent Supreme Court cases: Munaf v. Geren, 553
U.S. 674 (2008); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,
542 U.S. 507 (2004). Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d at 610.
239
Id. at 611.
240
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009).
241
Id. at 236.
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though not required, test. It will lay out the optimum analysis derived
from the cases outlined above. This test will be formatted to provide a
framework from which future cases may derive a complete skeleton of
the test, piecing together the patchwork segments of the lower federal
courts.
The test, to be described in more detail below, will consist of three
questions: (1) Is there a right to be free from the harm alleged,
whether it is designation, detention, or treatment as an enemy
combatant?; (2) Was that right clearly established at the time of harm?;
and (3) Has the plaintiff pled facts sufficient to support a finding that
the right was violated?
A. Is there a right to be free from the harm alleged, whether designation,
detention, or treatment as an enemy combatant?
In light of all cases considered, there appears to be a general
consensus that Americans retain a right to be free from the treatment
each plaintiff underwent. Two courts approached this consideration
by briefly cycling through possible constitutional violations posed by
the plaintiff in the complaint. The three rights mentioned include the
Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment, the Sixth Amendment right to access the courts, and the
Fifth Amendment right to be free from self-incrimination.242
The most persuasive of the rights alleged is that of the Eighth
Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. The
district court’s opinion in Padilla v. Yoo utilized a comparison between
the rights of enemy combatants and those of prisoners.243 In persuasive
precedent, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged the Supreme Court’s
declaration that due process rights of detainees were “at least as great
as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted
prisoner” and that the Eighth Amendment also “provide[s] a
minimum standard of care for determining [detainee] rights.”244 In
addition, the Supreme Court has reasoned that “[p]ersons who have
been involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate
treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose
conditions are designed to punish.”245 The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals (“the Seventh Circuit”) also found that the Eighth
242

U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748
(9th Cir. 2012).
244
Id. (quoting Oregon Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003)
(emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted)).
245
Id. (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982)).
243
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Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
applied to the plaintiffs in Vance v. Rumsfeld.246 The court first waded
through precedent extending this right, beginning with the Supreme
Court’s 1979 declaration that “[d]ue process requires that a pretrial
detainee not be punished.”247 In addition, the Supreme Court issued a
complementary statement that “[w]here the state seeks to impose
punishment without [an adjudication of guilt], the pertinent
constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause.”248 With the final
point that “we have consistently said” that pretrial detainee
constitutional protections are “at least as great as the Eighth
Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner,” the Court
declared that it “[is] confident that the Framers meant to forbid
abusive treatment of uncharged and unconvicted detainees where the
same abusive treatment of a convicted prisoner would be
prohibited.”249 The court of appeals gave great weight to the Supreme
Court’s conclusion that “[p]risoners retain the essence of human
dignity inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity animates the
Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man.”250 In addition, the court cited
the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the Eighth Amendment
“embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards,
humanity, and decency . . . against which we must evaluate penal
measures.”251 In summary, the Eighth Amendment provides ample
protection to enemy combatants, in light of the general consensus that
the rights of convicted prisoners establish the floor of Constitutional
protection for detainees.
One of the three courts that addressed this issue—the district
court in Padilla v. Yoo—concluded that the plaintiffs’ Sixth
Amendment right to access the courts was violated.252 The court
founded its reasoning in a series of precedent. To begin the analysis,
the court equated the rights of convicted prisoners with those of the
246

Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 609 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted,
vacated (Oct. 28, 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133
S. Ct. 2796 (2013).
247
Id. at 607 n.10 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 537 n.16 (1979)).
248
Id. (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n.40 (1977)).
249
Id. (quoting Washington v. LaPorte Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 306 F.3d 515, 517 (7th
Cir. 2002)).
250
Id. at 608 (quoting Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011)).
251
Id. at 609 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976)).
252
Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1034–35 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d
748 (9th Cir. 2012).
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enemy combatants; since convicted prisoners have the constitutional
right to access the courts, enemy combatants should be afforded an
equivalent right.253 The prisoner’s “right of access to the courts
includes contact visitation with his counsel.”254 Then, the court pulled
from a case holding that an enemy combatant defendant
“unquestionably has the right to access to counsel in connection with
the proceedings.”255 The district court in Doe v. Rumsfeld held that the
right of access to courts was not violated, implying this right should be
evaluated beside other constitutional claims in this portion of the
test.256 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit held there was no right
of this type.257 In conclusion, the right to access courts qualifies for
analysis, depending on whether the jurisdiction equates convicted
prisoner rights with those of enemy combatants.
Finally, the only court to address the Fifth Amendment right to
avoid subjection to self-incrimination—the district court in Padilla v.
Yoo—rejected the argument that this right applied to plaintiffs in these
cases.258 The court reasoned that the Fifth Amendment is only
applicable “when the accused is compelled to make a Testimonial
Communication that is incriminating.”259 It takes more than mere
compulsive questioning to violate the Self-Incrimination Clause.260 It
is probable in future cases with like facts that the Fifth Amendment
Self-Incrimination Clause will not be relevant to analysis of rights
violated.
The district court in Doe v. Rumsfeld held that the alleged actions
violated the Due Process Clause’s “shock the conscience” standard.261
The Supreme Court has long utilized the shock the conscience
standard against federal officials to punish acts that offend “basic
notions of human dignity and a civilized system of justice.”262 The
Supreme Court has held abuse in “interrogation techniques, either in
isolation or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular
253

Id. at 1034 (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 350 (1996)).
Id. (quoting Ching v. Lewis, 895 F.2d 608, 610 (9th Cir. 1990)).
255
Id. at 1035 (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539 (2004)).
256
Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 121 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
257
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 977 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 653 F.3d 591
(7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 701 F.3d 193 (7th
Cir. 2012).
258
Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1036 (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408
(1976)).
259
Id. (quoting Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 408 (1976)).
260
Id. (quoting Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003)).
261
Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 115.
262
Id. (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172–74 (1952)).
254
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suspect” could violate the Due Process Clause.263 The Court has also
affirmed the perpetual need to “give protection against torture,
physical or mental,” through the Due Process Clause.264 In the case of
Doe v. Rumsfeld, the plaintiff alleged multiple offenses that, taken
individually, would arguably not shock the conscience.265 The correct
method of evaluation, however, is to “determine the cumulative impact
of the conduct alleged.”266 Two theories of liability are raised: intent to
injure and deliberate indifference.267 In the case of Doe, the conduct
alleged violated both standards.268 Intent to injure is “most likely to rise
to the conscience-shocking level,” and the plaintiff sufficiently alleged
this intent because of Rumsfeld’s extensive role in policy creation.269
Note that the “mere assertion” of a legitimate government interest in
detention is not sufficient to “void an otherwise properly pleaded
constitutional claim.”270 Deliberate indifference, rising between
negligence and intent to injure, was met, because Doe was in the
federal government’s custody when he suffered mistreatment.271 The
only exception to this standard has been found in times of emergency
to restore order, but this exception does not apply to these cases.272
The district court in Vance v. Rumsfeld addressed this issue, holding that
for now the “plaintiffs have set forth the cumulative allegations
necessary to state a claim of mistreatment.”273 They maintained that
the determination of whether the conduct violated the shock the
conscience standard should be evaluated further along in the
proceeding.274 The determination of whether the conduct alleged
263

Id. (quoting Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985)).
Id. at 115–16 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937)).
265
Id. at 116 (“Here Doe alleges, inter alia, that he was detained incommunicado
and often in solitary confinement. He also says he was exposed to extreme and
prolonged cold and continuous light, blindfolded and hooded, subjected to sleep
alteration and deprivation through exposure to light or blasting music, denied some
food and water, and physically assaulted . . . . Doe says several ‘psychologicallydisruptive tactics designed to induce compliance’ were used on him throughout his
detention at Camp Cropper.”).
266
Id.
267
Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 116.
268
Id. at 116–17.
269
Id. at 116 (quoting Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998)).
270
Id. at 117.
271
Id. at 118.
272
Id. (citing Cnty. of Sacramento, 523 U.S. at 852–53).
273
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 653 F.3d 591
(7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 701 F.3d 193 (7th
Cir. 2012).
274
Id. (“While the evidence may ultimately show that neither the individual
treatment methods not their cumulative impact ‘shocks the conscience,’ that
264
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shocks the conscience grants another avenue for plaintiffs in these
cases to allege that harm occurred through designation or detention
as an enemy combatant.
The courts made further comments striking down various
defensive arguments. For example, the Seventh Circuit in Vance v.
Rumsfeld stated that the setting of the violation, a war zone, made no
impact on whether an American can claim a constitutional right to be
free from torture.275 The Ninth Circuit was clear that torture of
American citizens, including outside the United States border, is
unconstitutional without doubt.276 Additionally, the district court in
Doe v. Rumsfeld held that American citizens have the right to remain
free from confinement that shocks the conscience.277
Jurists
considering the issue should keep these possible defenses and
rebuttals in mind when evaluating the next comparable case. The
subsequent phase of the inquiry, whether the right to be free from
harm was clearly established at the time of injury, is the most complex
consideration of the test.
B. Was the right to be free from the harm clearly established at the time of
the injury?
The second phase of the test will determine whether there was a
right to be free of the alleged harm at the time of injury. This will be
divided into four considerations: (1) constitutional protections; (2)
federal authority; (3) case law precedent; and (4) possible collateral
complications.
1. Constitutional Protections
The right of an American to be free from the treatment detailed
in each particular case is derived from two arguments. First, the Eighth
Amendment right of convicted prisoners corresponds to enemy
combatants, and second, the Constitution continues to protect
Americans acting abroad: “The specific designation as an enemy
combatant does not automatically eviscerate all of the constitutional
protections afforded to a citizen of the United States.”278
determination is not one we may properly make at this stage of the proceedings.”).
275
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 606–07 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted,
opinion vacated (Oct. 28, 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013).
276
Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 763 (9th Cir. 2012).
277
Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 115. The court later found that this right was both
clearly established and violated. Id.
278
Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748
(9th Cir. 2012).
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i. Enemy combatant constitutional protections mirror
those of prisoners.
The complaints detailed in the sample of cases outline treatment
that would “clearly violate the rights afforded to citizens held in the
prison context.”279 Though the legal framework for American enemy
combatants was developing at the time of injury, “federal officials were
cognizant of the basic fundamental civil rights afforded to detainees
under the United States Constitution.”280 For example, the Supreme
Court has held that denial of medical treatment to prisoners violates
the Constitution.281 Further, the Court has also held that those who
have not been convicted of a crime and are involuntarily committed
are “entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions of
confinement than criminals whose conditions are designed to
punish.”282 The clearly established law concerning the treatment of
convicted prisoners provides a basis for determining that the law
against mistreatment of American enemy combatants was clearly
established at the time of injury.
The Ninth Circuit raised a counterargument that, since it was not
clear the plaintiff was “just another detainee,” the notion that
American enemy combatants were to be afforded the same protections
as convicted prisoners was not clearly established.283 The difference in
status is evidenced, according to the court, by the conflicting purposes
for detaining each type of detainee.284 Criminals are detained to
achieve “retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.”285
On the other hand, President Bush declared in a June 9, 2002
memorandum to the Secretary of Defense that the purpose of
detaining the plaintiff, Padilla, was to prevent aid from reaching Al
Qaeda and to mine Padilla for intelligence.286 The court referenced
other circuit cases amenable to the idea that constricting access to the
outside world could be a persuasive purpose for military detention of
enemy combatants.287 One holding found that detention could be
necessary to limit the detainee’s access to communication with the
279

Id.
Id. at 1037.
281
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103–04 (1976).
282
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321–22 (1982). This case is cited both by
the district court in Padilla v. Yoo and Doe v. Rumsfeld. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 1035;
Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 119.
283
Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 762 (9th Cir. 2012).
284
Id.
285
Id. at 762 n.8 (citing Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2028 (2010)).
286
Id.
287
Id.
280
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enemy.288 Another found regulating religious observance could aid the
government in obtaining control over the detainee for the purposes of
enhanced interrogation success.289 Though it is tempting to fall into
this trap of abstraction and technicalities, this argument must fall
under scrutiny due to the reality of the situation. Plaintiffs are
American citizens with the inherent protections of the Constitution
from the federal government. A foreign setting or perceived higher
purpose cannot undermine centuries of clearly established liberties,
including the right to live free from arbitrary detention and
maltreatment, which could qualify as torture. After determining
whether the detainees should be afforded the Constitutional
protections of convicted prisoners, the next acknowledgment is that
American constitutional rights abroad were clearly established at the
time of injury.
ii. American constitutional rights abroad were clearly
established at the time of injury.
American citizens’ constitutional right to be free from the injuries
set forth in the cases above while in foreign countries was clearly
established at the time of harm.290 The district court in Doe v. Rumsfeld
dismissed Rumsfeld’s contention that no court had held an American
citizen possesses constitutional rights on a foreign battlefield when
detained by the American military.291 Precedent enforced the concept
that American citizens act abroad with the protection of the
Constitution and that “the shield which the Bill of Rights and other
parts of the Constitution provide to protect [a citizen’s] life and liberty
should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another
land.”292 The district court also took the time to distinguish a recent
D.C. Circuit case holding the issue of whether the Fifth Amendment
applied to aliens detained in Afghanistan and Iraq was not clearly
established around the time of this violation, 2004.293 The court
distinguished the circumstances because the plaintiff was an alien,
whereas Doe was an American citizen: “Clearly, a plaintiff’s citizenship
288

Id. (citing Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 395 (4th Cir. 2005)).
Yoo, 678 F.3d at 762 n.8 (citing Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 805
(D.S.C. 2011)).
290
See Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 119 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390
(D.C. Cir. 2012); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 969–70 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d,
653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 701
F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012).
291
Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d at 120.
292
Id. at 119 (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957)).
293
Id. at 120–21 (citing Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).
289
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often goes a long way in determining the scope of available
constitutional protections.”294
Similarly, the district court in Vance v. Rumsfeld began with
reference to a case facing the question of whether the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments apply to American citizens detained in foreign war
zones: “[T]he Fourth and Fifth Amendments certainly protect U.S.
citizens detained in the course of hostilities in Iraq.”295 The court was
also moved by the “oft-cited” Supreme Court plurality opinion of Reid
v. Covert:
The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution.
Its power and authority have no other source. It can only act
in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the
Constitution. When the Government reaches out to punish
a citizen abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other
parts of the Constitution provide to protect his life and
liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens
to be in another land.296
In addition, the Second Circuit has stated “[t]hat the Bill of Rights has
extraterritorial application to the conduct of federal agents directed at
United States citizens is well settled.”297 The court found recent D.C.
Circuit cases involving aliens bringing suit for abuse while detained to
be the most persuasive.298 Though the court granted qualified
immunity to the defendants in both instances, the decision to do so
rested in great part on the nationality of the plaintiffs.299 In In re Iraq,
the “plaintiffs’ non-citizenship was the primary factor” in holding for
the defendants.300 Similarly, in Rasul v. Myers, the D.C. Circuit not only
“relied on plaintiffs’ non-citizenship,” but also “reaffirmed that
American citizens are in fact entitled to such protections.”301

294

Id. at 121 (quoting Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 969 (N.D. Ill. 2010),
aff’d, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), and
rev’d, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012)).
295
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 969 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 653 F.3d 591
(7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), and rev’d, 701 F.3d 193
(7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Kar v. Rumsfeld, 580 F. Supp. 2d 80, 83 (D.D.C. 2008)).
296
Id. (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957) (plurality opinion)).
297
Id. (quoting United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 280 (2d Cir. 1974)).
298
Id.
299
Id. at 970.
300
Id. (citing In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litig., 479 F. Supp. 2d 85, 108–
09 (D.D.C. 2007)).
301
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 969 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 653 F.3d 591
(7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), and rev’d, 701 F.3d 193
(7th Cir. 2012) (citing Rasul v. Myers, 563 F.3d 527, 530–32 (D.C. Cir. 2009)).
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The district court in Vance v. Rumsfeld held that the treatment of
plaintiffs was especially reprehensible, because the decision to
perpetuate the treatment was not made during any emergency
requiring “split-second” decision-making.302 This argument derives
from a Supreme Court statement that behavior is particularly shocking
when the decision-maker has had “time to make unhurried judgments,
upon the chance for repeated reflection, largely uncomplicated by the
pulls of competing obligations.”303 The “tumultuous foreign setting” of
the location did not counter the clearly established constitutional
rights of American citizens abroad.304
Finally, the shock the conscience standard that the Supreme
Court imposed on federal officials through the Due Process Clause was
clearly established at the time of injury.305 The cases “declaring
unconstitutional conduct or conditions of confinement that shock the
conscience” span nearly a century and grant notice to representatives
of the federal government that interrogation techniques represent
ground for liability.306
There are many possible avenues to conclude the constitutional
protection of American citizens was clearly established at the time of
harm.
Beyond constitutional protections are federal statutory
safeguards that are in place for American citizens and useful in
evaluating whether the right to be free from the harm alleged was
clearly established.
2. Federal Authority
Statutory grounds for maintaining the right of American plaintiffs
to remain free from the detention and mistreatment described above
were clearly established at the time of harm and fall within both the
National Defense Authorization Act and the Detainee Treatment Act.
The Seventh Circuit in Vance v. Rumsfeld supported this position.307 The
court specifically referenced the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, 10 U.S.C. § 801, stat. note §
302

Id. at 971 (citing Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853 (1998)).
Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 853 (1998).
304
Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 971.
305
Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 115 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390
(D.C. Cir. 2012); Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 967 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d,
653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 701
F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012).
306
Id. at 120.
307
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 610 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted,
opinion vacated (2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S.
Ct. 2796 (2013).
303
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1092, which affirms that U.S. military interrogation techniques are
prohibited from violating the Constitution.308 The Act also directs the
Secretary of Defense to ensure military practices are “consistent with
international obligations and laws of the United States.”309 The
Detainee Treatment Act, specifically 10 U.S.C. § 801, stat. note § 1002,
explicitly limits authorized techniques to those expressly named in the
Army Field Manual, a guide which did not contain authorization for
the coercive techniques used on the plaintiffs.310 These additional
resources provide further grounds to prove the defendants named in
the cases named above operated under the knowledge that their
behavior was clearly established to be illegal.
The district court raised an opposing argument in Lebron v.
Rumsfeld.311 The court utilized the conflicting opinions in the branches
of the federal government on the legality of the treatment of the
plaintiff as grounds for proving that the illegality of the actions was not
clearly established at the time of injury.312 On one hand, the Office of
Legal Counsel of the Department of Justice “officially sanctioned” the
coercive techniques used against the plaintiff, concluding that they
were lawful.313 Additionally, the Department of Defense Working
Group on detainee interrogations issued a lengthy report concluding
that the interrogation techniques were lawful.314 On the other hand,
both the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the General Counsel of
the Navy “vigorously challenged” these contentions, maintaining that
the techniques violated both American and international law.315
Although the court proposed that this variance in opinion within the
executive branch served to clearly establish that this area is “the very
definition of unsettled law,” this logic is unpersuasive.316 Surely the
legal opinions of agencies and the executive branch staff are
persuasive, but to require unanimity among the politicized legal minds
before a concept can be clearly established would foreclose all
qualified immunity analysis. The court defended its hazy reasoning by
following the pattern of other courts that have “also shown a marked
reluctance to deny qualified immunity to officials in circumstances
where they were required to balance competing interests of the citizen
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316

Id.
Id.
Id.
Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 803 (D.S.C. 2011).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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and the government.”317 The reluctance stems from the complaint that
the required balancing is “subtle, difficult to apply and not yet well
defined.”318 It is little wonder that the standard continues to lack
definition, considering the mass grants of qualified immunity.
Continued avoidance of tackling the controversy, the merits of each
case, and of developing the standard to be applied will only perpetuate
the lack of guidance granted to lower courts. In addition to federal
statutory authority grants of notice, judicial precedent affords further
means of concluding that the rights of American citizens were clearly
established at the time of injury.
3. Case Law Precedent
The case law utilized to hammer out arguments in these cases only
serves to make a complex maze less maneuverable. The most cohesive
manner by which to organize the information is to divide it into two
sections: (1) a brief analysis of the three most discussed cases and (2)
a discussion of whether extensive precedent is even necessary to claim
that there is clearly established law on this point.
i. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, Ex parte Quirin, and Ashcroft v. alKidd
Though entire law review articles could be written solely on these
cases, this Comment would be remiss in not highlighting their
structural positions in the legal-analytical framework, as they make
appearances in many of the sample cases.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld is referenced in Padilla v. Yoo at both the district
court and appellate levels.319 Hamdi, a 2004 Supreme Court case, held
that a detained enemy combatant maintained a fundamental “right to
be free from involuntary confinement by his own government without
the due process of law.”320 This right included the right to access
counsel, notice as to the charges against him, and a fair opportunity to
be heard.321 The case was decided in 2004, which was too late to grant
notice to any of the case samples, and thus proved insufficient grounds
317

Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 801 (D.S.C. 2011), aff’d, 670 F.3d 540
(4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012).
318
Id. (quoting DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 806 (4th Cir. 1995)).
319
Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1037 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d 748
(9th Cir. 2012); Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 761 (9th Cir. 2012); see Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
320
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 531.
321
Id. at 533, 539. This case was not included in my case sample even though the
plaintiff was an American detained as an enemy combatant because the court did not
address the qualified immunity question.
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to find that the right to be free from mistreatment was clearly
established.322 Additionally, the court of appeals in Vance v. Rumsfeld
discounted the defendant’s reliance on Hamdi to demonstrate the
“struggle” with defining “the precise constitutional contours
applicable to the detention of individuals—citizen and non-citizen
alike—seized in a foreign war zone.”323 The court dismissed the
importance of Hamdi on two grounds.324 First, the case is one involving
procedural due process, which is not relevant to the discussion.325
Second, the case sheds “no useful light on how a reasonable federal
official might have thought that the Constitution permitted him to
torture, or to authorize the torture of, a civilian U.S. citizen.”326
Similarly, Ex parte Quirin, a Supreme Court case from 1942,
involved German agents claiming to be American citizens maintaining
a right to trial by jury when detained as unlawful belligerents.327
Citizenship was “immaterial,” and “as an unlawful combatant he was
subject to trial by military tribunal alongside the alien saboteurs.”328
The court of appeals in Padilla v. Yoo found that Ex parte Quirin
suggested to defendants that enemy combatants are afforded less
rights than prisoners.329 Disregarding the year in which the German
agents were detained as a time of patriotic fervor, the case is
distinguishable from the sample cases above. The court never
determined whether the agent was an American citizen or not, and the
plaintiff was not subjected to maltreatment that could be described as
torture. Though Ex parte Quirin is valuable to acknowledge, it has no
significant part to play in this analysis.
Finally, the Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. al-Kidd granted qualified
immunity to a former Attorney General after the alleged improper
detention of the plaintiff.330 The defendant authorized detention of
multiple suspects, claiming the purpose of detention was to use the
detainees as witnesses in a criminal trial.331 The plaintiff alleged that
322

Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1037 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d
748 (9th Cir. 2012); Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 761 (9th Cir. 2012).
323
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 610 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted,
opinion vacated (Oct. 28, 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013).
324
Id.
325
Id.
326
Id.
327
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942), modified sub nom. U.S. ex rel. Quirin v. Cox,
63 S. Ct. 22 (1942).
328
Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 758–59 (9th Cir. 2012).
329
Id.
330
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. 2074, 2085 (2011).
331
Id. at 2077.
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the authorization was intended to detain suspected terrorists against
whom the federal government lacked sufficient evidence to charge
with a crime.332 The court of appeals in Padilla v. Yoo argued that the
Supreme Court’s grant of qualified immunity to the defendant
affirmed that there was no clearly established right at the time of the
alleged violations to be free from injury.333 This argument is not
convincing. The scope of the Ashcroft holding is quite narrow. First,
the Court did not address claims that the Eighth Amendment
violations were clearly established, because the plaintiff was not
subjected to brutal treatment as were the plaintiffs here. The clearly
established analysis was limited to Fourth Amendment violations.334
Second, the holding is narrowly confined to material-witness warrants:
“At the time of al-Kidd’s arrest, not a single judicial opinion had held
that pretext could render an objectively reasonable arrest pursuant to
a material-witness unconstitutional.”335
Though deceptively
precedential at first glance, Ashcroft v. al-Kidd cannot be relied on as a
means to find that American citizens do not have a clearly established
right to be free from maltreatment upon detention as an enemy
combatant.
The relevant judicial precedent above warrants consideration, but
ultimately it sheds no affirmative light on the issue at bar: whether the
right of American citizens to be free from mistreatment was clearly
established at the time of injury. This has little impact on the
cumulative analysis, considering it is likely that judicial precedent is
not required in these cases.
ii. Necessity of Judicial Precedent
Several courts relied on the argument that no court, in addressing
the issue of qualified immunity, has specifically discussed the right of
Americans to be free from maltreatment when designated as enemy
combatants.336 Given the nature of the violations alleged in these cases,
however, “[t]his is not a case where the precise violation must have
been previously held unlawful.”337 As the Seventh Circuit stated so
332

Id. at 2079.
Yoo, 678 F.3d at 758–59.
334
Id.
335
al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct. at 2083.
336
Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 764 F. Supp. 2d 787, 803 (D.S.C. 2011), aff’d, 670 F.3d 540
(4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012); see Yoo, 678 F.3d at 761 (“[I]t
remains murky whether an enemy combatant detainee may be subjected to conditions
of confinement and methods of interrogation that would be unconstitutional if
applied in the ordinary prison and criminal settings.”).
337
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, 610 (7th Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted,
333
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eloquently, “[w]here the constitutional violation is patently obvious
and the contours of the right sufficiently clear, a controlling case on
point is not needed to defeat a defense of qualified immunity.”338 A
comparable Seventh Circuit case requiring no direct precedent denied
qualified immunity to officials who chained a prisoner for seven hours
to a post in the sun.339 Particularly compelling is the Ninth Circuit’s
Hydrick v. Hunter, addressing the lack of clearly established precedent
concerning psychiatric hospital conditions of confinement for sexual
offenders.340 The court held that though the law in the area was “still
evolving,” the rights “afforded [convicted] prisoners set a floor for
those that must be afforded [sexually violent predators].”341 Because
of the nature of the offenses, ranging from violence to squalid
conditions, “surely it is clear that certain actions . . . transgress the
boundary” between legal and illegal, regardless of specific judicial
precedent.342 The district court in Doe v. Rumsfeld similarly dismissed
the need to find identical precedent, as “the Court need not require
previous declarations that the constitutional right existed in identical
factual circumstances.”343 Additionally, the district court in Vance v.
Rumsfeld acknowledged how important it is “that we not shirk from
protecting against clear constitutional violations simply because the
clear general right has not previously been enforced in the precise
circumstances facing the court.”344 The Supreme Court has similarly
claimed that “[t]here has never been . . . a section 1983 case accusing
welfare officials of selling foster children into slavery; it does not follow
that if such a case arose, the officials would be immune from damages
or liability.”345 The principles apply easily to the situation at hand. In
these cases, American citizens were detained by officials of the federal
government and subjected to brutal treatment.
The federal
opinion vacated (Oct. 28, 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013).
338
Id.
339
Id. (citing Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002)).
340
Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, Hunter v Hydrick, 566
U.S. 1256 (2009), remanded to 669 F.3d 937.
341
Id. at 989.
342
Id. at 990 n.8.
343
Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 120 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390
(D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Where preexisting law would dictate to a reasonable official that his
conduct is unconstitutional, even if prior case law has not explicitly addressed identical
circumstances, the unconstitutionality of that conduct may be found clearly
established.”).
344
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 970 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 653 F.3d 591
(7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 701 F.3d 193 (7th
Cir. 2012).
345
United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 271 (1997) (internal citations omitted).
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government has been on notice since the country’s inception that the
nation belongs to its citizens and is not to be used as a cruel hand of
oppression by the trusted elected officials. A final consideration
remains: what is the impact of the tumultuous state of “torture” in
national and international law?
4. Collateral Complication: The Definition of Torture
One objection to finding that American citizens have the right to
be free from the treatment described in the sample cases is that the
definition of “torture” has been muddied and pulled between
competing political interests. This Comment contends, however, that
even without the title of “torture” to describe the alleged conduct, the
legal foundation prohibiting such conduct was clearly established at
the time. It offers a brief summary of the issues to provide the reader
with a well-rounded concept of the facets of the legal-analytical
framework provided.
Although it was clear from 2001 to 2003 that torture referred to
“intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental,” it was unclear what constituted severe pain and suffering.346
The following sources of information were available at the time of the
dates in question. First, the Eighth Amendment has historically
protected American citizens from the infliction of “cruel and unusual
punishments.”347 In 2002, the State Department issued a statement
confirming that “[t]orture is prohibited by law throughout the United
States.”348 In addition, it encouraged that “[n]o official of the
Government, federal, state or local, civilian or military, is authorized
to commit or to instruct anyone else to commit torture.”349 There are
“[n]o exceptional circumstances [that] may be invoked as a
justification of torture.”350 An international agreement that the United
States signed in 1988, the Convention against Torture, defined torture
as “[a]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person, information or a confession,
punishing him . . . or intimidating or coercing him . . . .”351 In addition,
by 1994, a federal statute criminalizing torture abroad defined torture
346

Padilla v. Yoo, 678 F.3d 748, 764 (9th Cir. 2012).
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
348
Yoo, 678 F.3d at 763 n.10.
349
Id.
350
Id.
351
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, art. 1.1, Apr. 18, 1988, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, 23 I.L.M. 1027.
347

PERDUE (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

1/19/2015 5:45 PM

COMMENT

255

as “an act committed by a person acting under the color of law
specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering (other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions)
upon another person within his custody or physical control.”352 The
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 defined torture as “any act,
directed against an individual in the offender’s custody or physical
control, by which severe pain or suffering (other than pain or suffering
arising only from or inherent in, or incidental to, lawful sanctions),
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted . . . .”353 All of
these sources were readily available to American lawmakers from 2001
to 2003.
In addition to American sources, other countries had legislation
illuminating the meaning of “torture” for reference from 2001 to
2003.354 The European Court of Human Rights’ leading decision on
torture held that wall standing, subjection to noise, hooding,
deprivation of drink and food, and deprivation of sleep did not
constitute torture: “they did not occasion suffering of the particular
intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture as so understood.”355
The Israeli Supreme Court, however, found sleep deprivation, stress
positions, hooding, violent shaking, and exposure to loud music to be
against their law.356 These two cases demonstrate the two foremost
international sources of debate on the definition.
At the time of the defendant’s actions, there was also precedent
in the Ninth Circuit in which defendants were found guilty of
“torture.”357 In a 2001 suit under the Convention against Torture, the
plaintiff was severely beaten for a month while interrogated.358 On one
occasion, the plaintiff was tied, blindfolded, and burned with cigarettes
for over one week.359 In a 1996 suit under the Alien Tort Statute,
torture of the plaintiff was found when he was blindfolded, beaten,
threatened with electric shock, threatened with death, denied sleep,
subject to waterboarding, and imprisoned in an unlit and hot cell for

352

18 U.S.C. § 2340(1) (2004).
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102–256, § 3(b), 106 Stat. 73
(1991) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1991)).
354
Yoo, 678 F.3d at 764–65.
355
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 59, 80 (1978).
356
HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Israel 53(4) PD 817,
1482–85 [1999] (Isr.), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471.
357
Padilla v. Yoo 678 F.3d 748, 766 (9th Cir. 2012).
358
Al-Saher v. I.N.S., 268 F.3d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001), amended by, 355 F.3d 1140
(9th Cir. 2004).
359
Id.
353
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seven months.360 These examples demonstrate sources of American
judicial precedent discussing the definition of torture, thus granting
elucidation to the contested word.
Once it is decided that the rights of Step One were clearly
established at the time of harm, the final determination in Step Two is
whether the alleged facts of the complaint are sufficient to support a
claim in federal court.
C. Did the plaintiffs plead factual allegations sufficient to support a
claim that the clearly established right was violated?
The final portion of analysis is broken into two possible
considerations: causation and violation. Though some court analyses
grouped causation analysis with the preceding Bivens evaluation, this
Comment includes causation here as a means to prove violation,
separating the two into categories simply for the sake of organization.
1. Causation
Federal officials are liable for the reasonably foreseeable
consequences of their conduct when they have “crafted the policies for
or authorized facially unconstitutional action.”361 Causation analysis is
broken into two parts: procedural due process and substantive due
process.362 The procedural due process hurdle is quite high in light of
the facts of the cases, requiring evidence that defendants either
“personally authorized” the acts or were “deliberately indifferent” to
the treatment of plaintiffs.363 In the case of Doe v. Rumsfeld, it was not
enough that Rumsfeld had final say over whether to continue
detention of plaintiffs and the ability to reform the Camp’s
procedures.364 Plaintiffs were required to plead facts to allege with
particularity that Rumsfeld controlled the procedural rights of the
detainees.365 The district court in Vance v. Rumsfeld also held in favor
of the defendant as far as the procedural due process claim went,
holding that the facts alleged did not “go beyond a speculative level.”366
Though procedural due process claims face little hope of survival,
360

Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789, 790–91 (9th Cir. 1996).
Doe v. Rumsfeld, 800 F. Supp. 2d 94, 113 (D.D.C. 2011), rev’d, 683 F.3d 390
(D.C. Cir. 2012).
362
Id. at 113–14.
363
Id. at 114.
364
Id. at 114–15.
365
Id.
366
Vance v. Rumsfeld, 694 F. Supp. 2d 957, 977 (N.D. Ill. 2010), aff’d, 653 F.3d 591
(7th Cir. 2011), on reh’g en banc, 701 F.3d 193 (7th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 701 F.3d 193 (7th
Cir. 2012).
361

PERDUE (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

1/19/2015 5:45 PM

COMMENT

257

substantive due process analysis is more forgiving to plaintiffs.
Substantive due process claims in the sample cases face greater
success than the procedural due process claims. Case law on
substantive due process supports the argument that those who give
orders are personally liable for the effects of the conduct ordered.367
Precedent includes a case in which plaintiffs enjoyed success after
suing the head of the Department for Child and Family Services for
creating policy that violated their constitutional rights.368 Substantive
due process does not require direct causation, only that the defendant
set in motion acts she or he knows or should know will cause the
harm.369 For example, an assistant city attorney was found liable after
drafting a letter denying a permit for a parade.370 Liability was imposed
despite the fact that senior city officials revised the letter and others
approved and signed the denial.371 The court found causation between
the defendant’s actions and the denial of constitutional rights, because
there were not enough intervening factors.372 The reasoning was
grounded in the claim that the defendant’s written opinion was a
“substantial factor” in the overall denial of the permit.373 Of further
note is a case involving two Department of Homeland Security
attorneys, held liable for advising customs agents that they could refuse
to release confiscated property.374 The reasoning was grounded in the
argument that the unconstitutional seizures were foreseeable as a
result of the advice.375 Judicial precedent has successfully applied the
principle that those who order the denial of constitutional rights could
be held liable for the actions of their subordinates.
The causation between the defendants and the harm that served
as the basis for the substantive due process claim is widely accepted as
an element to be proven in the case samples through sufficient facts to
show that defendants “knew of, ordered, and approved the alleged
constitutionally deficient interrogation methods and detention

367

Id. at 962.
Id. (citing Doyle v. Camelot Care Ctrs., Inc., 305 F.3d 603, 614–15 (7th Cir.
2002)); see also Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995).
369
Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1032–33 (N.D. Cal. 2009), rev’d, 678 F.3d
748 (9th Cir. 2012).
370
Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1220 (10th Cir. 2006).
371
Id.
372
Id.
373
Id.
374
Anoushiravani v. Fishel, No. CV 04-212-MO, 2004 WL 1630240, at *5 (D. Or.
July 19, 2004).
375
Id.
368
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conditions.”376 The factors supporting this view in Doe v. Rumsfeld
include defendant’s personal approval of enhanced interrogation
techniques, the deployment of Major General Miller to “gitmo-ize” the
Camp, and memorandums and groups created for the purpose of
evaluating enhanced interrogation techniques.377 Nearly identical
considerations influenced both the court of appeals and district court
in Vance v. Rumsfeld to hold that there were sufficient facts alleged to
support the claim that Rumsfeld was “personally involved in the
unconstitutional treatment.”378 The district court in Padilla v. Yoo
similarly found that the defendant, Yoo, caused the violation of the
plaintiff’s rights.379 Relevant facts indicating foreseeable injury
included Yoo’s participation in the development of policy, his work
laying the legal framework for the designation of enemy combatants,
his personal review of the plaintiff’s file, and his legal advice that
federal officials could detain Americans because the Fourth
Amendment would not apply.380
In utilizing relevant analysis to establish that there was causation
between defendant’s actions and the harm suffered by plaintiffs, the
foundation of the legal-analytical framework determining that there
was a violation of rights is concluded. Causation in conjunction with a
defendant’s proven violation of rights signifies that a plaintiff has
pleaded with enough particularity to support a claim.
2. Violation
This final step is much more forgiving to the plaintiff than those
discussed above. This stage simply requires a closer look into the facts
alleged in the complaint to determine whether they are sufficiently
particularized to support a holding that the defendant’s actions
violated the clearly established right. In the case of Padilla v. Yoo in the
district court, the treatment alleged was deemed to violate the Eighth
Amendment and the right of access to the courts.381 The persuasive

376
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allegations in the complaint included shackling, loud noises at all
hours, psychological stress, and impermissible denial of medical
care.382 The district court in Doe v. Rumsfeld held that “Doe has pleaded
factual allegations sufficient to support a claim that Rumsfeld’s
conduct violated [the] clearly-established right” to be free from actions
that shock the conscience.383 This is evidenced by the claims of extreme
exposure to cold and light, being hooded, and the deprivation of
sleep, water, and food.384 The court of appeals in Vance v. Rumsfeld
made it clear that an argument that the treatment did not violate a
constitutional right “would be futile.”385 Additionally, it held that the
defendant’s claims that the complaint was vague were “not persuasive,”
reasoning that phrases such as “extreme cold” were specific enough to
meet the pleading requirements.386 The district court in Vance v.
Rumsfeld found that the description of the complaint merited an
assumption that the “conditions of confinement were torturous,” a
violation of the shock the conscience standard.387 The cases not
mentioned either did not reach this stage of analysis because of a
finding that the right to be free from the treatment was not clearly
established or were decided solely on the grounds of Bivens. If a
defendant is found to have violated a clearly established right, the
claim may proceed, and the court must grapple with the merits of the
plaintiff’s case.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has held that a “state of war is not a blank
check for the President when it comes to the rights of the Nation’s
citizens.”388 When an American citizen has not been charged, held
captive by the federal government, and subjected to treatment
reserved for detainees in Guantanamo Bay, it is the duty of the
opposing branches of government to take a stand on the nation’s
behalf. When the judiciary, the ultimate symbol of justice and equity,
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bows its hallowed head in deference to the executive branch, the
country has suffered a loss. The interplay between the American
citizen’s constitutional rights and the executive’s right to protect the
nation from danger is meant to be a balance, not a perpetually tilted
scale.
The remedy is grounded in the country’s legislative and judicial
branches. The legislature, “fully aware of the body of litigation arising
out of the detention of persons following September 11, 2001, has not
seen fit to fashion a statutory cause of action to provide for a remedy
of money damages under these circumstances.”389 In addition, every
final decision stemming from the four cases resulted in the haphazard
grant of qualified immunity, usually as a side note to Bivens analysis.
With the legislative and judicial branches balking at the opportunity to
provide answers to the country concerning the horrendous allegations,
the executive’s blank check has effectively been written.
This nation deserves, after over a decade of war and scandal, to
lay claim to a clear, fair, and just legal-analytical framework for these
claims. The standard set forth above, thorough and an attempt at
clarity, sews together the scattershot arguments, complaints, and
analyses littered through thirteen different opinions. Remember that
denying qualified immunity to the defendant is not equivalent to
holding in favor of the plaintiff. This is just the first step in permitting
the parties to obtain evidence through discovery and litigate the merits
of their cases before a judge, a right guaranteed by the Constitution.
Designation as an enemy combatant “does not automatically eviscerate
all of the constitutional protections afforded to a citizen of the United
States,” and defendants’ shield of qualified immunity should not deter
courts from detailed and thorough analysis.390
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